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Senator Guy Gillette 
Foils the Execution Committee
by Jerry Harrington
FDR felt he needed total partisan loyalty if his New 
Deal programs were to succeed. In his first term, the 
President relied on the art of persuasion to keep con­
gressional Democrats in line. Later his methods be­
came less subtle.
L ong considered a Republican strong­hold, the state of Iowa has on several 
occasions in its history ignored tradition and 
sent Democrats to Congress. One such con­
gressman, Guy M. Gillette of Cherokee, 
challenged the Republican party’s twentieth- 
century domination of state politics with his 
election in 1932 to the House of Representa­
tives from western Iowa’s Ninth District. 
Gillettes election, of course, coincided with 
the dramatic victory of Franklin D. Roose­
velt over incumbent Republican President 
Herbert Hoover, a victory that signaled the 
beginning of the New Deal in the United 
States. Unlike many of his freshman col­
leagues in Congress, however, Guy Gillette 
stood somewhat outside the New Deal fold, 
supporting his party leader on most issues 
but refusing to endorse the President’s pro­
gram of political and economic reform with­
out question.
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During his two terms in the House, from 
1933 to 1936, Gillette established himself as 
an independent Democrat with moderate 
views, a stance Roosevelt found increasingly 
at odds with his own desire to keep a tight 
rein on the Democratic Congress. Gillette’s 
election to the Senate in a special election in 
1936 therefore increased not only the 
Iowan’s visibility in national politics but also 
the apparent vulnerability of the New Deal 
legislative coalition that had been forged 
during Roosevelt’s first term of office. With 
the Iowa primary elections just a fewr months 
ahead, Roosevelt concluded that he had to 
find a replacement for the recalcitrant 
legislator from Iowa.
G uy M. Gillette had been born near Cherokee in 1879. He attended Drake 
University Law School, was admitted to the 
Iowa bar in 1900, and returned to his home­
town in northwestern Iowa to practice law.
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He served there as city attorney and Cherokee 
County’s prosecuting attorney. Gillette was 
elected to the state senate as a Democrat in 
1912, and he held this post until 1916, when 
he entered military service. When he re­
turned to Iowa after serving in World War I, 
he found he had been nominated to run for 
state auditor in the 1918 campaign. Defeated 
in the election, he decided to give up law and 
go into dairy farming. Not until 1932, when 
his friends persuaded him to run for the U.S. 
House of Representatives from the Ninth Dis­
trict, did he re-enter politics, and this time he 
won the seat by a 10,000-vote majority.
Following Roosevelt to Washington in 
1933, Gillette established himself as a sup­
porter of the New Deal, though not an un­
critical one. He voted for most major New 
Deal bills, but opposed both the National In­
dustrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. Gillette was re-elected in 
1934 by a 26,000-vote margin. In 1936, he 
was re-nominated for a third term, but 
decided to abandon his House seat to run for 
the Senate when the death of Democratic 
Senator Louis B. Murphy opened up a two- 
year term. He was elected, thus arriving in 
the Senate at the same time as former Iowa 
governor Clyde Herring, who had won a full 
six-year term in the same election.
Gillette had no sooner taken his oath of of­
fice in the Senate than he plunged into a con­
troversy over the Supreme Court. Roosevelt, 
stunned by New Deal setbacks at the hands 
of the court during his first term, announced 
on February 5, 1937 that he hoped to nomi­
nate for the Supreme Court justices who 
were sympathetic to his ideals of govern­
ment. He proposed that a new justice be ad­
ded for every member w ho was seventy years 
old or older and who had had more than ten 
months’ experience on the court, up to a 
maximum of six additional judges.
Gillette wasted little time in disclosing his 
opposition to the plan. Three days after the 
White House announcement he stated that 
he would fight the bill, calling it innoppor- 
tune, untimely, and “an attempt to afford 
political control of the Supreme Court.’’
The high court itself soon lessened Roose­
velt’s need for the plan by ruling in favor of 
the New Deal’s National Labor Relations Act 
in April and the Social Security Act in May. 
Also, Roosevelt was able to appoint New Deal 
Senator Hugo Black of Alabama to the court, 
thus strengthening its liberal complexion. His 
legislation to enlarge the court, however, did 
not pass, and the “victory” the President won 
over the court left a bitter taste in his mouth, 
especially when he recalled the initial Senate 
opposition to the measure.
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Roosevelt’s impatience with Congress was 
heightened when he found that many legisla­
tors were also reluctant to approve other 
measures in the steady stream of New Deal 
legislation. The 75th Congress, elected in 
1936, was overwhelmingly Democratic and 
seemed a ready and willing partner to pass 
further progressive legislation. With unem­
ployment nearing the five-million mark by 
the summer of 1937, FDR called a special 
session to convene in November and pre­
sented a five-point plan calling for crop con­
trol, wages and hours legislation, executive 
reorganization, regional planning, and revi­
sion of the antitrust laws. But Congress, des­
pite its seemingly liberal outlook, balked at 
the President’s plan. Cries of "dictatorship” 
came from the lawmakers and the media 
and, despite his 1936 mandate, Roosevelt 
found himself on the defensive. He was 
especially angered by the resistance from 
members of his own party, including Gillette 
of Iowa.
Gillette, following his opposition to the 
Supreme Court bill, joined the Democrats 
who voted against the administration’s 
wages and hours bill. Then, early in 1938, he 
spoke out against the farm bill, claiming that 
it gave too much power to the secretary of 
agriculture, and joined with Southern Dem­
ocrats and Republicans to block an anti­
lynching bill. Gillette also opposed an in­
crease from $250 million to $400 million in 
emergency appropriations to counter the 
1938 recession, and he came out against an 
amendment to the Social Security Act grant­
ing the federal government greater authority 
over state officials operating under state 
unemployment compensation laws.
Gillette’s voting reflected more than a dis­
agreement with the administration over in­
dividual pieces of legislation. Gillette’s 
philosophy of government differed from that 
of the New Deal. While the New Deal pur­
sued a policy of vastly increased government
spending to meet the problems created by 
the Depression, Gillette said in 1938 that 
there must be a curtailment of the 
tremendous government expenditures 
not absolutely essential to meet the 
demands for relief. . . . the gain from 
engaging in further pump priming 
would not be proportionate to the 
heavy further burden of indebtedness 
and obligations it would invoke.
On another occasion, he said that he favored 
"the largest measure of state and local con­
trol as in keeping with provisions of the act to 
be administered.” If Roosevelt wanted to ex­
pand federal power to deal with the nation’s 
economic troubles, he could not count on the 
support of the Iowa senator.
T he first stirrings of what would be­come direct action against Gillette and 
other dissident Democrats began in 1938 
soon after the third session of the 75th Con­
gress. Meeting at the home of WPA head 
Harry Hopkins, a group of New Dealers dis­
cussed the possibility of ridding the party of 
"reactionaries” and creating a genuine liber­
al-conservative alignment. Nicknamed the 
"execution committee,” the group included 
Hopkins, Secretary of the Interior Harold P. 
Ickes, Justice Department official Robert 
Jackson, WPA administrator David K. Niles, 
presidential secretary James Roosevelt, and 
presidential assistants Thomas Corcoran and 
Benjamin Cohen. The committee believed 
that the survival of the New Deal depended 
upon actions that would commit the Demo­
cratic party to it, and they concluded that 
the place to begin the process was in the 
Democratic primaries and congressional
races of 1938.
The idea was to defeat Senate opponents 
of the court-packing bill who were seeking 
renomination in the Democratic primaries, 
and Gillette of Iowa was one of the senators
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marked for defeat. The others were Freder­
ick Van Nuys of Indiana, Walter F. George 
of Georgia, Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, 
and “Cotton Ed” Smith of South Carolina. 
The long-range goal was a realigned party 
system, with liberals in one party and conser­
vatives in the other. After all, so Roosevelt 
believed, he had pulled much of the 75th 
Congress to victory on his coattails, only to 
discover that many of those elected were op­
posed to further New Deal reforms.
Roosevelt himself repeatedly denied to the 
press and public that he knew of the execu­
tion committee’s plans. He did not, however, 
place any restraints on the committee mem­
bers during the months that followed. Roose­
velt never publicly reprimanded any of the 
group for their actions or for what they were 
attempting to do. His part in the purge at­
tempts began quietly and cautiously, and 
with no definite plan of action.
As the attention of the execution commit­
tee turned to Gillette and Iowa, it found that 
the Democratic party in the Hawkeye State 
was facing a critical year. In the election of 
1932, FDR had carried the state by a 183, 
536-vote plurality over Iowa native Herbert 
Hoover. The voters’ dissatisfaction with the 
GOP stemmed from the devastating effect of 
the Depression on farm prices and the in­
ability of the Republicans to deal with the 
economic crisis. Iowa voters sent Democrats 
Clyde Herring to the Statehouse and Louis 
Murphy to the Senate. Six of the nine con­
gressional seats were won by Democrats, an 
amazing fact in light of the state’s long 
Republican tradition. In 1934, Herring was 
re-elected and Democrats captured fifty- 
nine seats in the Iowa House (compared to 
forty-nine for the Republicans) and retained 
six of the nine U.S. House seats.
But Iowa’s defection to the Democratic 
party was beginning to come to an end in 
1936. FDR carried Iowa for a second time, 
but Democratic Lieutenant Governor Nelson
W. Kraschel ran nearly 100,000 votes behind 
the President in his successful bid for the 
governor’s chair. Republicans gained a con­
gressional seat and captured twenty of the 
thirty-two state senate seats. The parties 
were evenly divided in the Iowa House. 
Though the two U.S. Senate seats were won 
by Democrats Herring and Gillette, farm 
prices started to recover and the Republicans 
were confident that they would soon return 
to power.
D espite signs of a Republican resur­gence, the execution committee found 
that several political liberals were thinking 
of challenging Gillette. The best-known of 
these was Governor Kraschel, who was con­
sidered by liberals to be a New Dealer with­
out reservation. He had especially strong 
support in the eastern counties along the Mis­
sissippi River, where the bulk of Iowa’s 
Democratic vote was found. Kraschel pon­
dered whether to run against Gillette in late 
1937 and early 1938, evaluating the support 
he might receive from the administration 
and from Iowa Democrats. The governor 
made his decision in January 1938, after he 
and his wife had travelled to Washington as 
overnight guests of Roosevelt in the White 
House. Kraschel conferred with the Presi­
dent and with Iowa’s congressional delega­
tion on his possible Senate candidacy, and 
after returning to Des Moines he ended spec­
ulation by announcing on February 1 that he 
would seek a second term as governor.
Kraschel’s decision to stay out of the Sen­
ate race stemmed partly from his belief that 
a squabble between two major Democratic 
officeholders would split the party and deliv­
er the Senate seat into Republican hands. 
Also, Senator Herring had earlier said that 
he would be neutral in the coming primary, 
thus robbing Kraschel of possible aid from 
the state’s third major political figure.
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Kraschel also knew that the gubernatorial 
nomination was his for the asking, that he 
could play it safe rather than undertake a 
risky campaign for the Senate. Finally, and 
perhaps most important, he had come to be­
lieve that Gillette could not be denied 
renomination.
Other possible liberal challenges to Gil­
lette mentioned in the Iowa press were Ros­
well Garst of Coon Rapids (an avid New 
Dealer who had drafted the corn-hog adjust­
ment program); former Iowa Supreme Court 
Justice Leon Powers; and such lesser figures 
as State Treasurer Leo J. Wegman, Insur­
ance Commissioner J. Ray Murphy, and 
Lieutenant Governor John K. Valentine. 
None of them, as it turned out, entered the 
Senate race. Nor did Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace, an Iowa native, allow his 
name to be considered.
The first real challenge to Gillette was also 
the first woman to run for the Senate from 
Iowa, Mrs. Elizabeth Richardson of Eddy- 
ville. In her announcement on January 20, 
1938, she declared that she would run as a 
supporter of the New Deal programs. Subse­
quently, on March 1, W. G. Byerhoff of Fort 
Dodge, the 1936 Democratic state commit­
tee campaign speaker, began his candidacy, 
and three days later Carroll attorney J. J. 
Myers followed suit.
The most important liberal to run against 
Gillette emerged on February 28, when Sev­
enth District Congressman Otha Wearin of 
Hastings declared that he was a candidate for 
Gillette’s Senate seat. With his announcement, 
Wearin made it clear that he considered him­
self the sole Iowa New Deal candidate.
Born near Hastings in 1903, Wearin had 
graduated from Grinnell College and had 
spent a year in Rome studying agriculture. 
He subsequently wrote a book on his travels, 
and following his return to Hastings, he 
worked on his father’s farm and became ac­
tive in the local Farm Bureau. In 1927 he
was elected president of the county Farm 
Bureau, and a year later he was elected to 
the Iowa House, becoming the chambers 
youngest member. Re-elected in 1930, 
Wearin was the Democratic candidate for 
speaker in the Republican-dominated 
House. Two years later he ran for Congress, 
finishing third in the Democratic primary7, 
but winning the nomination at a district con­
vention called because no candidate had re­
ceived the necessary 35 percent plurality. As 
the Democratic nominee, he was swept to 
Washington in the Roosevelt landslide.
L ike Gillette, Wearin voted against the AAA and the NIRA. But on other issues 
he quickly became known as a staunch New 
Dealer, and following his re-election in 1934 
he joined Maury Maverick’s weekly discussion 
group of avid Roosevelt backers. In 1936 he ac­
quired a seat on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, where he worked to promote the 
New Deal’s undistributed profits tax.
During the Supreme Court fight, Wearin 
collected information and passed it along to 
James Roosevelt, the President’s son. In one 
meeting he told the younger Roosevelt that he 
was considering challenging Gillette in the 
1938 Iowa primary. After Kraschel an­
nounced his decision to stay out of the race, 
Wearin also hinted to the press that he was 
thinking of running. Before making his final 
decision, however, he received a call from the 
White House and was invited to a private 
meeting with the President. According to 
Wearin, several of his friends had consulted 
with Roosevelt and had suggested that he 
speak with the Iowa congressman “about the 
dangerous proportion a primary fight might 
attain in Iowa.” In the half-hour conversation 
with the President, Wearin received no indi­
cation that Roosevelt would publicly endorse 
his candidacy. Roosevelt merely said that he 
had no inclination to see the congressman
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Congressman Otha Wearin (far left) with Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt on the campaign trail, 
1936 (SHSI)
retire from public life, hinting that Wearin 
could find a job with the administration if his 
candidacy failed. If FDR wanted Wearin to 
be the New Deal candidate in Iowa, he kept 
that information to himself.
Later that day, in the privacy of his office 
and without consultation with his friends, the 
thirty-five-year-old congressman decided to 
run for the senate. The reasons he cited in his 
autobiography were more personal than po­
litical. His father had recently died, leaving 
Wearin with the responsibility of operating 
the Hastings farm. And, as he saw it, the six- 
year Senate term would offer him more se­
curity and a better opportunity to supervise 
his personal affairs and settle his family in 
one place for a longer period of time. His
belief in the New Deal undoubtedly played a 
role in the decision, but this seemed to take a 
back seat to personal considerations, espe­
cially in light of the absence of authentic ad­
ministration support.
Still, Wearin’s announcement some two 
weeks later was worded to link him with the 
Roosevelt administration. The first two par­
agraphs of the press release read:
After a series of conferences at the 
White House and with administration 
leaders, Congressman Otha Wearin, 
Iowa farmer, announced his candidacy 
for the U.S. Senate today.
Wearin, an active member of the 
House liberal group, has been a militant 
supporter of President Roosevelt's legis-
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lative program.
He had purposely included the hint of White 
House support, he later wrote, as a means of 
“kindling the fire” and “leaving the door 
open” for later administration aid. Whether it 
would materialize, he had no way of know­
ing. He knew only that the administration 
wanted Gillette defeated, and he therefore of­
fered himself as the New' Deal candidate.
T he declaration took Washington by sur­prise. White House press secretary Ste­
phen Early issued a “no comment” on the 
candidacy and said that Wearin had not vis­
ited the White House in two weeks. In a press 
conference, Roosevelt himself repeated his 
pledge that his administration would not 
meddle in state primaries. Gillette, who had 
already announced his re-election plans, 
rushed to the White House and met with 
Roosevelt. After the meeting, the Senator told 
reporters he had been assured that the ad­
ministration would be neutral.
Meanwhile, Wearin’s hint of administration 
approval for his candidacy seemed to be taking 
effect in some circles. Richard Wilson of the 
Des Moines Register wrote: “The implication 
of the Wearin statement was that he bears ad­
ministration approval.” Similarly, the Burling­
ton Hawk-eye Gazette suggested that Wearin 
could hardly have linked his candidacy with 
Roosevelt “without an understanding.”
Much of the Iowa reaction to Wearin’s 
candidacy, however, was hostile. The Dav­
enport Democrat declared that it could see 
no valid reason why Wearin should oppose 
Senator Gillette, and the Council Bluffs 
Nonpareil termed Wearin a “presidential 
puppet,” exercising “no independent judg­
ment.” K. E. Birmingham, chairman of the 
state Democratic party, said he had not been 
consulted before Wearin’s announcement 
and suggested that the state party did not ap­
prove. At a party conference in Cherokee, he
was quoted as saying that “Senator Gillette’s 
opponents do not stand a ghost of a chance of 
defeating him in the primary.”
Despite the opposition in Iow a, the execu­
tion committee went ahead w'ith plans to 
link Wearin with the administration. In ear­
ly May, James Roosevelt and West Virginia 
Senator Jennings Randolph accompanied 
Wearin to a Young Democrats rally at Har­
pers Ferry, West Virginia. The trip was ac­
companied by all the trappings of a political 
endorsement, including a limousine and a 
police escort. Wearin’s supporters distrib­
uted pictures of the rally to Iowa newspa­
pers, leaving the impression that he had 
strong Newr Deal support. Launching his 
campaign in Dubuque on May 16, Wearin 
declared: “Democrats in Iowa who believe
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in President Roosevelt cannot consistently 
support the present senator.” The question, 
he said, was whether Iowa would “go down 
the line with the New Deal” or “register 
disapproval of it and Roosevelt.” At the same 
time, the administration withdrew its sup­
port for a new bridge at Dubuque — one of 
Gillette’s pet projects — fearing that it 
would aid the senator in eastern Iowa.
illette, in the meantime, seemed to be
concerned by Wearin’s criticisms. 
Shortly after Wearin’s announcement of his 
candidacy, Gillette voted in favor of the ad­
ministration’s controversial executive reor­
ganization plan, despite his earlier opposi­
tion to the measure. On the same day that 
Wearin began his campaign in Dubuque, 
Gillette sent thousands of letters to Iowans 
reminding them of New Deal bills he had 
supported, including the rural electrification 
program, flood control, the Civilian Conser­
vation Corps, the feed and seed loan pro­
gram, and the 1938 farm bill.
On May 24 the execution committee, in a 
statement by Harry Hopkins, made its first 
direct comment on the Iowa primary. Reg­
ister reporter Wilson asked Hopkins, a native 
of Grinnell, his opinion of the Gillette-Wear- 
in contest. Wilson was initially rebuffed, but 
he was later called back to Hopkins’ office 
after the WPA director had conferred with 
Corcoran at the White House. Upon 
Wilson’s return, Hopkins issued a statement 
reading, “If I voted in the Iowa primary, I 
would vote for Otha Wearin on the basis of 
his record.”
The Hopkins statement was the top story 
in the next morning’s Register, and it trig­
gered an immediate response in both Wash­
ington and Iowa. On the Senate floor, Gil­
lette condemned Hopkins for interfering 
with Iowa politics and insisted that Roose­
velt himself was neutral. He said that the
statement was “definitely unfair and unjust 
to the President, as carrying the imputation 
that he is not sincere in his statements of 
neutrality, but is practicing deception by 
countenancing interference in devious and 
dubious ways by others.” In Iowa, Governor 
Kraschel dashed off a telegram to Roosevelt 
and presidential advisor James A. Farley, 
urging that they take a stand on the matter 
and damning Hopkins for his assault on “the 
freedom and independence of the primary 
voters.” Reflecting the opinion of other Iowa 
newspapers, the Cedar Rapids Gazette ac­
cused Hopkins of using WPA funds as “a po­
litical whip with which to make national af­
fairs run according to the private wishes of 
the public politicos.”
Wearin, of course, made the most of the 
Hopkins statement, claiming that it proved that 
the administration supported his campaign. 
Wearin’s backers also went to work. First 
District Congressman Edward Eicher declared 
that “the surest way to support the President” 
was to vote for Otha Wearin, and in making 
the declaration he implied that he was doing so 
with Roosevelt’s approval. Similarly, Iowa 
State Treasurer Wegman sent a telegram urg­
ing Hopkins to “stand by your guns.”
T he Hopkins endorsement polarized the Iowa Democratic party and forced Gil­
lette and his supporters to take the matter 
more seriously. Returning to Iowa two days 
ahead of schedule, Gillette defended his in­
dependent Senate record as one in which he 
had voted according to his best judgment 
and blasted Wearin as a “rubber stamp.” 
After meeting in Des Moines with party of­
ficials from around the state, Gillette ad­
dressed a Davenport radio audience, draw­
ing a parallel between European dictators 
and New Deal officials attempting to in­
fluence the Iowa primary.
By this time, Iowa Democrats had begun
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committing themselves to one of the two ma­
jor candidates. La Mar Foster of West 
Branch, the speaker of the Iowa House, en­
dorsed Wearin by saying that the congress­
man’s defeat would be “heralded as a defeat 
for the New Deal.” Other Wearin endorse­
ments came from Congressman Eicher, State 
Treasurer Wegman, U.S. District Attorney E. 
G. Dunn, former Iowa Senator Dan Steck, 
and Iowa United Auto Workers President 
Homer Martin.
But the Wearin campaign could not match 
the powerful forces lining up behind the Gil­
lette candidacy. Iowa congressmen Fred 
Biermann and Vincent Harrington publicly 
supported Gillette, the latter having re­
turned to Iowa to deliver a series of radio ad­
dresses on Gillette’s behalf. With the excep­
tion of Wegman, all elected state officials — 
including Governor Kraschel — committed 
themselves to Gillette. Though he publicly
“This gang of political termites . . . 
boring from within . . . [is] plan­
ning on taking control of the Dem­
ocratic party organization. . . . ”
claimed to be neutral, Kraschel sent letters to 
influential Iowa Democrats listing sixteen 
New Deal bills opposed by Wearin, strongly 
suggesting that Gillette’s support for the New 
Deal was greater than Wearin’s. In his let­
ters, Kraschel warned that Democrats 
should be aware of the contradiction be­
tween Wearin’s rhetoric and his record and 
that they should select their candidates 
“without reference to anything but their 
record and merit.”
In addition, Gillette was now receiving 
covert assistance from Secretary of Agricul­
ture Wallace. The Iowa-born cabinet mem­
ber was seriously thinking of running for the
presidency in 1940, and he feared that a split 
in the Democratic ranks would hurt his 
chances of capturing the Iowa delegation. 
Wallace also opposed the concept of a purge, 
especially one directed against Gillette, 
whom he respected and considered a valu­
able ally in securing farm legislation.
The secretary contacted Senator Herring, 
and the two men then proceeded to suggest a 
“peace pact’’ between Wearin and Gillette, 
in which the loser would pledge to back the 
winner in the fall campaign. On June 2, Her­
ring called Wearin, and in urging the agree­
ment he indicated that the idea had origi­
nated with Roosevelt and that he had in­
itiated it to preserve party unity. Wearin, 
however, refused to sign the peace pact. In­
stead, he contacted Congressman Eicher, 
who met with the President and issued a 
press statement publicizing the move, saying 
that Roosevelt had assured him that “he had 
requested no such statement” and that any 
“claim he had done so was entirely without 
foundation or authority.”
The reason for the suggested peace pact 
was obvious: Herring, like Kraschel, had 
abandoned his neutrality pledge. Knowing 
that much of Wearin’s support came from 
those who believed that Roosevelt was behind 
the congressman, the governor and Wallace 
wanted to nullify this perception by hinting 
that the President was neutral. Wearin’s reac­
tion, however, foiled this effort.
I n the final days of the campaign, Gil­lette crisscrossed the state, portraying 
himself as an independent legislator standing 
alone against the organized forces of out­
siders from Washington. Never attacking 
Roosevelt directly, he assaulted Corcoran, 
Hopkins, and other administration officials 
by colorfully describing them as
this gang of political termites who are 
even now engaged in boring from with-
ON HIS RECORD
30 years ol distinguished state 
and national public service.
A splendid m ilitary record in 
Spanish-Am erican and World 
Wars.
A consistent supporter of the 
federal adm inistration in eco ­
nomic and social reforms.
This com pares favorably with 
a rubber stam p.
The voters of Iow a should 
nom inate their candidates free 
from outside political influ­
ence.
Tell Mr. Harry Hopkins that 
w e are  not interested in how 
he would vote in Iowa.
Do y o u r  d u ty  a t  th e  p o lls  a n d  h e lp  to re -n o m in a te
SENATOR GILLETTE
A handbill circulated by supporters of Senator 
Guy M. Gillette during the primani campaign 
of 1938 (SHSI)
T he Iowa Democratic turnout in the June 1938 primary was some 15,000 votes 
greater than in the primary of 1936, making it 
the largest Iowa Democratic primary vote in 
history. Voters gave Gillette a nearly two-to- 
one victory over Wearin, 81,605 votes to 
43,044. The incumbent senator was renomi­
nated with more votes than all four of his op­
ponents combined. Wearin’s only source of 
support came from his own Seventh District, 
where he carried all thirteen counties. Gillette 
carried the rest of the state. His most im­
pressive victories came in Dubuque County — 
where he received 8,724 of 11,782 votes cast — 
and in Woodbury County, where Wearin re-
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in, in destroying the edifice that the voters of 
the nation have erected on a democratic 
foundation and even now are planning on 
taking over, if possible, the control of the 
Democratic party organization in 1940.
He also continued to challenge Wearin’s 
claim that the congressman was the New 
Deal candidate by citing both candidates’ 
records and pointing to his opponent’s votes 
against administration measures.
A final round of endorsements, coming 
just days before the primary, further height­
ened the drama. On June 1, Kraschel met 
with Gillette, and in a radio address broad­
cast two days later by five Iowa radio sta­
tions, he publicly endorsed him. In strong 
language he charged that “Otha and his gang 
are deliberately sponsoring a policy that 
would prostitute the basic principles of 
American government.” As he had done in 
his private letters, he stressed the assurances 
of neutrality he had received from Roosevelt 
and explained to his listeners that he was tak­
ing a stand because of the administration’s 
attempts to influence the primary. Another 
key endorsement came the next day, when 
Senator Herring announced from Washing­
ton that he had voted for Gillette on his ab­
sentee ballot. This marked the first time he 
had publicly stated a preference.
On the same day as Kraschel’s radio ad­
dress, District Attorney Dunn released a let­
ter from James Roosevelt expressing his sup­
port for “my friend Otha Wearin.” Earlier, 
questions had been raised about the strength 
of administration support for Wearin after 
the President’s son failed to come to Iowa 
while visiting the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, 
Minnesota. But the younger Roosevelt now 
denied that support from Washington was 
less than 100 percent. Only ill health, he 
said, had prevented him from coming to 
Iowa to campaign for Wearin.




ceived only 816 votes to Gillette’s 4,288.
Gillette eventually won the November elec­
tion over his Republican opponent, L. J. 
Dickinson, in a close contest. He served in the 
Senate until his defeat in 1944 and was re­
elected to a single term in 1948. Wearin re­
turned to his Hastings farm and later ran a 
second unsuccessful race for the Senate, as 
well as a campaign for governor.
The final result of the 1938 purge attempt 
against Guy Gillette was not so much a defeat 
for the New Deal as it was a defeat for New 
Deal election tactics, which, as it turned out, 
were based on several errors in judging the 
Iowa situation. The New Dealers erred, first 
of all, in attempting to use a young Iowa con­
gressman to unseat an established statewide 
figure. Gillette had long experience in Iowa 
politics and was able to make use of his con­
tacts in the final days of the campaign.
Second, administration officials gave their 
support to a candidate with dubious New Deal 
credentials. Wearin was not the solid New 
Deal backer he claimed to be, and Gillette had 
supported most New Deal measures, the major 
exceptions being the court-packing bill and 
wages and hours legislation. Gillette and his 
supporters were able to exploit these facts.
Third, the New Dealers’ support for Wearin 
came in the form of what appeared to be edicts 
from such figures as Harry Hopkins and James 
Roosevelt. Such endorsements were portrayed 
in Gillette’s camp as federal interference in a 
state election and they had the effect of tying 
Wearin to those who were attempting to tell 
Iowans how to vote.
Fourth, the New Dealers were attempting 
to oust a senator who had the support of 
most of the key Iowa political figures, in­
cluding Governor Kraschel, Senator Her­
ring, and Secretary of Agriculture Wallace. 
Following Hopkins’ endorsement of Wearin, 
these leaders threw their full support to the 
Gillette campaign, and against this kind of 
political establishment Wearin had little 
chance of success.
Fifth, there were signs that Iowa voters 
were adopting a more conservative voting 
pattern. As mentioned earlier, the Republi­
can party was regaining its former strength 
in the state. In the fall, Kraschel lost to his 
Republican opponent and this, together with 
Gillette’s slim victory, showed a declining 
enthusiasm for liberal candidates. This trend 
continued in 1940, when Wendell Willkie 
carried Iowa in his presidential campaign 
against Roosevelt.
Finally, it was a mistake for Roosevelt to 
remain shrouded in mystery, refusing to in­
dicate even to Wearin that he favored his 
candidacy. The President’s silence hurt 
Wearin and confused New Deal Democrats 
in Iowa, for without official endorsement 
from the White House, Wearin could not 
prove that he was, indeed, the New Deal 
candidate. Roosevelt learned from his error 
and took full and public control of the purge 
battle in his fireside chat later in June. Iowa 
voters had shown their president the wisdom 
of frank and forthright leadership. It was a 
lesson he would not soon forget. □
